The Shocking Truth: Iran's Botched Spy Ring in Israel

Just weeks before the outbreak of Operation Rising Lion, Israeli security services uncovered a wide-reaching Iranian espionage effort operating inside the country. The network relied on dozens of Israeli citizens, many of whom were approached online and offered money in exchange for intelligence gathering, propaganda distribution, and even violent missions.

According to a detailed report in The Guardian, more than 30 Israelis have been charged with aiding Iranian intelligence since Tehran launched its massive missile assault on Israel in April 2024. While the Islamic Republic aimed to cultivate high-level spies capable of carrying out assassinations and sabotage, the operation mostly ended in failure. At best, the Iranians managed to persuade recruits to take photos of military installations, spray graffiti, and hang posters attacking Israeli leaders.

Court documents from multiple cases reveal a strikingly consistent recruitment method. The initial contact usually came through Telegram or anonymous emails from accounts posing as news agencies or anti-Israel activist groups. The messages promised payment for seemingly harmless tasks—taking photos, gathering information, or reporting on local events. Once contact was established, handlers quickly raised the stakes, offering more money for more dangerous missions and urging recruits to open crypto wallets to receive the funds.

One of the first missions described in court was simple: a newly recruited Israeli was asked to check whether a black bag was buried under a bench in a public park. Nothing was found, but the recruit filmed the location and sent the video back to his handler as proof. Encouraged by the payment, he agreed to further tasks, including distributing leaflets and spray-painting slogans like “Bibi brought Hezbollah here” and “Bibi = Hitler” in city centers.

Another case involved an Israeli man of Azeri descent who turned espionage into a family affair. He and his relatives were paid to photograph sensitive sites across the country. Their targets included the Haifa Port, the Nevatim Airbase in the Negev, the Mossad headquarters in Glilot, and Iron Dome batteries. The photos they provided were later linked to Iranian missile targeting during the 12-day war.

Perhaps the most serious plot involved an Israeli citizen who was initially recruited for minor surveillance tasks but was eventually asked to assassinate a nuclear scientist working at the Weizmann Institute. The Guardian report states that this scientist had been on Iran’s radar for years, a potential retaliation target following the assassinations of numerous Iranian nuclear experts widely attributed to Mossad.

The handler offered $60,000 for the mission, and the recruit agreed. He hired four local criminals, all Arab Israelis, and together they attempted to enter the Weizmann compound on September 15 of last year. The presence of a security guard thwarted the plan, and the group left without incident. The very next day, the Iranian contact instructed the recruit to return to the site and take photos of the scientist’s car. That mission was completed, earning him just over $700. He was then asked to plant a GPS tracker on the vehicle but refused.

This pattern repeated in multiple cases. Once recruits showed a willingness to perform simple actions, they were immediately tested with more extreme assignments. Some were asked to find hitmen. Others were encouraged to consider throwing explosives at Prime Minister Netanyahu’s car. The Azeri spy’s relatives were even approached about arranging an assassination but declined.

Despite the volume of activity, Iran failed to gain real traction. None of the high-level operations succeeded. No officials were harmed. No scientists were killed. And none of the low-level recruits evolved into the kind of long-term operatives Iran had hoped to cultivate.

While Israel’s intelligence community has spent years training and embedding deep-cover agents to surgically target Iran’s most guarded assets, Tehran took a very different approach—opting for mass recruitment of untrained, expendable individuals. That strategy collapsed under pressure. The result was a string of arrests, broken cells, and a failed campaign that only underscored the strength of Israeli counterintelligence.

The war may still be ongoing, but in the shadowy world of espionage, this round went decisively to Israel.