Shocking New Findings Expose Failures Hours Before October 7 Massacre
Internal IDF investigation uncovers ignored warnings, delayed responses, and critical intelligence mishandling in the hours before the attack.
New revelations from an internal IDF investigation into the October 7 massacre paint a troubling picture of intelligence and operational failures at the highest levels. The findings were presented to the internal inquiry panel appointed by former IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, chaired by former generals Yoav Turgeman, Amikam Norkin, Amos Yadlin, and Brig. Gen. Ofer Levy.
According to the investigation, “SIM” alerts, indicators of suspicious militant activity by Hamas were triggered on Thursday night, but information from the Shin Bet was only passed to the military the following evening.
Despite standing procedures that require an immediate situation assessment in such cases, no high-level meeting was convened by the chief of staff, the head of military intelligence, or the head of the operations directorate.
Officers approached the head of military intelligence to discuss the alerts, but he dismissed the issue with a single word: “Unnecessary.” The head of the Southern Command claimed relevant conversations took place, framing them as a situation assessment, a distinction with legal implications. He also noted that his intelligence officer was on maternity leave at the time.
During the attack, IDF estimates initially assumed a few hundred terrorists had breached the border; in reality, over 5,000 took part in the massacre.
On the morning of the attack, Gaza Division commanders urgently requested that the air force bomb sections of the border barrier to prevent further infiltrations. At 9:47 a.m., the division commander called the air force operations center directly, pleading for immediate strikes.
Air force officials later referred to this as “the moment the penny dropped.”
Still, more than two hours passed before the bombing was carried out, with the explanation that forces were tied up striking Hamas command posts.
Only after the strike at 12:30 p.m. did Hamas begin to withdraw.
One of the most disturbing findings emerged from the pre-attack timeline: at 6:10 a.m., roughly 20 minutes before the attack began, a Shin Bet officer called the Gaza Division operations officer and told him, “Team Tequila is on its way to you.”
The officer was surprised by the statement.
Minutes later, the Shin Bet officer called again, instructing him to “forget what I said”, even though the team had already departed.
The committee classified this as a “most severe incident.”
The inquiry assigns “major responsibility” to the head of military intelligence and “heavy responsibility” to the then-operations chief.