IDF’s Gaza City Plan Exposed: Can They Finally Stop Hamas from Escaping?

As the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) prepare to invade Gaza City, the focus has shifted from the scale of reservist mobilization, estimated at 25,000 to 50,000 troops, with up to 130,000 reservists potentially involved, to a critical tactical challenge: preventing Hamas terrorists from escaping among the roughly one million civilians expected to flee. The IDF’s primary concerns include minimizing Israeli soldier casualties, protecting Israeli hostages, and reducing Palestinian civilian deaths. Historically, to avoid these risks, the IDF has allowed mass evacuations, enabling Hamas to blend into civilian crowds and evade capture. This strategy has significantly reduced Hamas casualties, with only 2,100 fighters killed since March 2025, averaging 350 per month compared to thousands monthly in the war’s early stages.

The IDF’s recent operation in Beit Hanoun, where it claimed to dismantle a Hamas “battalion” of just 30 fighters, underscores the difficulty of targeting Hamas within civilian populations. Previously, a battalion meant around 1,000 fighters, highlighting Hamas’s shift to guerrilla tactics, including hit-and-run operations and smaller cells, after losing senior leaders like Yahya Sinwar in October 2024. To counter this, the IDF could adopt riskier tactics, such as rushing infantry into Gaza City without initial heavy bombardment to catch Hamas off guard, increasing the chance of direct confrontations but also soldier casualties. Alternatively, surrounding the city and methodically inspecting small groups of evacuees could reduce Hamas’s ability to flee, though this slower approach risks more attacks on IDF forces and less immediate harm to civilians.

The IDF’s contrasting operations at Al-Shifa Hospital in November 2023 and March 2024 illustrate these options. In November, allowing unchecked mass evacuations led to no fighting, with the IDF seizing Hamas equipment but failing to target fighters. In March, a surprise encirclement resulted in significant fighting, killing or capturing hundreds of Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives, though it caused more civilian and IDF casualties and hospital damage. Current indications suggest the IDF may repeat past patterns, allowing Hamas to escape. If Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu forgoes another hostage deal to strike Hamas harder, as stated on August 20, 2025, “If we had a starvation policy, no one in Gaza would have survived after two years of war,” continuing to let fighters flee undermines that goal. Effective prevention requires bold tactical shifts to prioritize dismantling Hamas’s remaining forces.