JFeed Exclusive: The Hard Truth from Israel’s Former Reserve Chief

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s announcement that Israel is going to conquer the city of Gaza – not “encircle,” not a “limited operation,” but a conquest – shook the political and military system. Just before the Cabinet meets, Danny Van Buren Brig Gen. (res.), a research fellow at ICGS, formerly Chief Reserve Officer, Chairman of ‘Nikraim Ladegel’, is not holding back: he poses the simple but deadly question – are we truly intending to defeat Hamas, or will we once again settle for the middle ground, only to find ourselves in the exact same place in two years.

"We’ve reached a crossroads," he begins, "Either we defeat Hamas – or this will be just another link in our chain of failures."

"The Real Debate Is Not ‘How’ – But ‘Whether’"

Van Buren clarifies: the arguments over tactics – whether to conquer all of Gaza or just the north, to encircle or enter – are secondary. "The real question is strategic: has the State of Israel decided to go for the defeat of Hamas, to remove it from its military and civil rule, or are we willing to settle for the achievements we’ve reached so far, try to free hostages through an agreement, and acknowledge that Hamas remains the sovereign in Gaza."

He does not spare criticism of political statements: "Netanyahu says ‘defeat Hamas,’ but he doesn’t paint it in clear colors. The public doesn’t know what it means on the ground. Commanders in the field don’t always know if that’s truly the end goal. And the enemy – they know how to read it."

According to him, this is not a matter of terminology but of strategic compass: "The conquest of Gaza will look completely different if the goal is to end Hamas rule, than if the goal is to pressure them into a deal. Two different moves, two different plans – and completely different outcomes."

"Enough with Hasbara – We Need to Create Awareness"

One point where Van Buren especially heats up is Israel’s public diplomacy policy: "The word ‘hasbara’ is a fundamental mistake. It reflects an apologetic approach, as if we always need to justify ourselves. A country confident in its narrative does not apologize. It creates a narrative, dictates the discourse, and markets it proactively."

He recalls the diplomatic tsunami Israel suffered in recent months: "If from day one we had positioned Hamas as a global problem – not just ours – things might have looked different. Hamas is a burden on Gaza, on the Middle East, on the world. That should have been the main message, not ‘we have the right to self-defense.’ When your message is ‘self-defense,’ you’re already on the defensive. We need to be on the offensive in the cognitive arena as well."

The Deadly Contradiction: Defeat vs. Negotiations

Van Buren identifies a dangerous strategic gap: "You can’t, on the one hand, broadcast to Hamas that we’re going to topple them, and on the other hand, conduct negotiations for a deal. These are two conflicting messages. It tells them they are valuable enough to sit with us at the table – and that they have a future."

He warns that this not only weakens Israel militarily, but also in the international arena: "Countries see this contradiction and understand we’re not truly intending to go all the way. It hurts deterrence, it hurts our legitimacy, and in the end, it will cost us in time and blood."

Three Levers on Hamas – And Only One Is Military

Van Buren details the three possible tracks to free the hostages, stressing that one cannot rely on only a single route:

"400,000 Soldiers? This Is Needless Fear-Mongering"

The IDF’s announcement of draft permits for up to 430,000 reservists raised questions. Van Buren rejects the numbers: "Even at the height of October 7, when we mobilized for all fronts – Gaza, the north, Judea and Samaria – the number was 350,000. To conquer Gaza, we don’t need hundreds of thousands. It’s enough to combine a critical mass of regulars with two to three reserve divisions."

He explains that the high readiness level is meant to allow scenario flexibility: "Yes, we must be prepared for ‘worst-case scenarios’ – the north, Judea and Samaria – but in practice, we won’t get close to that number."

Unprecedented Attrition – And the Social Cost

Van Buren does not ignore the human cost: "This is the greatest attrition we’ve seen in the reserves since the establishment of the state. People have been away from home for months. It hurts the economy, families, the body, and the soul."

According to him, there are two things that keep reservists going: "The first – a tailwind from society. The second – a sense of mission necessity. If one of them breaks, it’s very hard to restore motivation. When a soldier hears parts of society saying ‘this is a political war’ while he’s been serving for months, it cuts him to the core."

"If We Stop Now – It Will Come Back to Us"

His message is sharp: "In Lebanon, in Gaza – we left deep-rooted problems untreated. Every time we settled for a partial solution – it came back and exploded in our faces. Now, after all the price we’ve paid, there’s no choice but to finish the job. Otherwise – it’s only a matter of time until it returns."

The Coming Day – The Real Test of Intentions

Van Buren concludes with a look ahead: "Hamas must understand this is not another round meant to bring them to the negotiating table. This is a move intended to go all the way. If, along the way, hostages are released – excellent. If not – there are other ways. But if we stop here – we are only postponing the next clash, and it will be harsher."